Water Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 2

Article 9

1-1-2007

Assessing the Value of Adjudications in a World of Uncertainty:
An Economic Perspective
Bonnie G. Colby

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Bonnie G. Colby, Assessing the Value of Adjudications in a World of Uncertainty: An Economic
Perspective, 10 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 327 (2007).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

ASSESSING THE VALUE OF ADJUDICATIONS IN A
WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY: AN ECONOMIC

PERSPECTIVE*
BONNIE G. COLBY'

I. Introduction and Overview .................................................................
327
II. Adjudication in the Context of Economic Decisions and Pervasive
Uncertainty .......................................................................................
330
m. A Conceptual Framework for Economic Evaluation of
Adjudications ..................................................................................
332
A . C osts .........................................................................................
333
B . B en efi ts ..................................................
335
C. The Counterfactual - Constructing "With and Without"
Scen arios ................................................................................
338
D. State of Knowledge on Adjudication Costs, Benefits ......... 343
E . D ata Needs ..............................................................................
346
F. Well-Defined Accounting Stance ..........................................
347
G. Benefits and Costs Over Time ..............................................
348
IV. Potential Criteria for Evaluating Adjudications ............................. 348
VI. Closing Thoughts and Recommendations ...................................... 353

I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Water rights adjudications have been underway for several decades
in the western U.S. to clarify the validity, scope, and priority date of
water rights. In principle, adjudications allow public agencies and
claimants to submit and scrutinize evidence supporting water rights in
t This paper also appeared in the conference materials for the American Bar
Association Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources' 25th Annual Water Law
Conference: Changing Values, Changing Conflicts, in San Diego, California, on February
22-23, 2007, as a part of panel discussion entitled "Forum for Changing Values: Do We
Still Need Adjudications?" For more information on this conference see the confer-

ence report in this issue of the WATER LAW REVIEW beginning on page 433.
1:. Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Arizona. The
author appreciates and acknowledges the research assistance of Izetta Chambers and
Lana Jones in preparing this article and comments from fellow ABA Water Law Conference panelists Peter Sly, Charles Dumars and Ramsey Kropf. The author acknowledges the financial and intellectual support provided by the Climate Assessment for
the Southwest (CLIMAS) Project at the University of Arizona, with funding from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
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a neutral court venue, accessible to all parties with standing, and
through a fair process. Comprehensive adjudications can lead to court
decisions that improve certainty for water claimants, provide direction
for future cases, and permanently ameliorate some water right ambiguities.
Disadvantages of the adjudication process include: excessive opportunities for water right holders to present evidence, necessitating a
burdensome number of hearings and costs for all parties; incentives to
make spurious and exaggerated water claims; and the requirement that
an entire basin be adjudicated even if a smaller section would suffice.
While water right changes and transfers generally can transpire during
an adjudication process, the process raises uncertainties that are likely
to have a dampening effect on such activities.
Many factors contribute to the need for the increased certainty that
adjudications are intended to provide. These include looming federal
reserved rights and the exercise of state authority over water rights
based on the McCarran Amendment.3 Rapid population growth in the
West, coupled with the emerging federal reserved rights doctrine and
the need to secure water for growing cities, contributed to the adjudications that started in the 1970s. 4 During this time the West was also
becoming increasingly urban, concentrating in "urban archipelagos"
like Denver, Las Vegas, and Phoenix.5 Numerous environmental needs
for water became evident, along with increased demand for water to
maintain stream flows and lake levels for recreation. 6 The energy crisis

1. For example, in one ruling in Washington State's Yakima Basin, Acquavella, the
court held that the interests of individuals can be represented by a larger entity like an
irrigation district or a ditch company. This ruling will reduce the time and cost of
future adjudications by reducing the number of parties involved. See WASH. DEP'T OF
ECOLOGY,
THE

ATTORNEY

WATER

GEN. OF WASH.,

RIGHTS

GENERAL

2002

REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: STREAMLINING

ADJUDICATION

PROCEDURES

10

(2002),

http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/0211019.pdf.

2.

Id.

3. See 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-67
(1963).
4.

See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF

THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 PART 1, 22

(1975), available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970pl-Ol.pdf;
see
also
PAMELA CASE & GREGORY ALWARD, REPORT TO THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW

ADVISORY COMMISSION - PATTERNS OF DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND VALUE CHANGE IN
THE WESTERN UNITED STATES: IMPLICATION FOR WATER USE AND MANAGEMENT 1 (1997),

available

at

https://repository.unm.edu/dspace/bitstream/1928/2793/ 1/PATTERNS.pdf.
5. A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western
Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 163,
163-65 (1999).
6. Id. at 168; see generally Office of Counsel, Corps of Engineers, Missouri River
Division, Dep't of the Army, The Role of Recreation in the Regulation of the Corps of Engineers
Constructed and OperatedMain Stem Reservoirs of the Missouri River, 4 GREAT PLAINS NAT.
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prompted by the oil embargo of 1973 led to increased water demand
7
in the energy-producing sector.
As federal support for new water development projects evaporated,
improved water management emerged as a goal of states, many of
which created new water management agencies. As population and
energy needs continued to grow, so did interstate conflicts over water.
States turned to adjudications as a way to demonstrate water use, helpful in securing water from interstate river negotiations. Federal involvement in western water became more evident, not only from postWorld War II Supreme Court decisions that affirmed federal authority
over water under specific circumstances, 8 but also from the Endangered Species Act,9 and other pollution control and conservation acts.' °
The erosion of states' control over local water added to the impetus for
adjudication of water rights."
There is a substantial body of literature describing various forms of
water rights adjudication processes and progress, or lack thereof, in
specific proceedings. 2 This article takes a different perspective, laying
out a framework for systematically considering the costs and benefits of
adjudications and discussing economic aspects of a question that is
being posed more frequently: are water rights adjudications a "worthwhile" use of scarce resources?
Economic evaluation of public expenditures in the United States
can be traced to the early 1800s when the Secretary of the Treasury
26, 43-44 (1999) (discussing the role of Corps of Engineers in establishing and regulating recreational facilities).
7. See e.g. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 497-99 (1988).
8. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 16667, 181 (1946) (establishing federal authority over water diverted in navigable
streams); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon (Pelton Dam), 349 U.S. 435, 437 (1955) (establishing federal authority over non-navigable streams with dams next to federal lands).
9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000) (limiting actions that threaten to modify or
destroy critical habitat for threatened and endangered species).
10. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (requiring federal permits for "dredge and fill" activities affecting navigable waters); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (allowing the federal government to determine the
relevant and appropriate environmental standards for the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites); Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715 (limiting actions which interfere with the migration of certain birds).
11. See D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses:
The History of Conflict, the Prospectsfor Accommodation, 21 ENvIL. L. 1, 3 (1991) (discussing federal assertion of management interests in western water resources).
12. See e.g., John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating
Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 355 (Spring 2006) (discussing specific comprehensive general stream adjudications); see also Christopher W. Moore,
Foreword to TAMRA PEARSON D'ESTREE & BONNI G. COLBY, BRAVING THE CURRENTS:
REsoURCESJ.

EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE RIVER BASINS OF THE
AMERICAN WEST ix-x (Ariel Dinar & David Zilberman eds., 2004) (discussing the re-

sponse to increasing and costly conflicts over water).
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In the

nearly two centuries since then, economic analysis has become commonplace for major federal projects and for new regulations, and is
now mandatory for many types of federal actions. 4 Given the emphasis
on evaluation of public expenditures in the United States, the time is
ripe to consider how best to evaluate the financial and economic aspects of adjudications. Policymakers and the public seek accountability. Public agencies are often stakeholders in adjudications, addressing
conflict expends public resources, and issues of public interest are at
stake. Public officials and taxpayers understandably want to know how
much money, time, and other resources are involved and whether positive results of the process justify incurred costs incurred.
Economic and financial evaluation can serve a number of purposes. First, it may help direct the use of public money and agency

staff toward processes that will be the most effective in fulfilling adjudication objectives. Economic analysis of past efforts will also generate
information to help courts, management agencies, and stakeholders
learn what strategies are likely to be the most effective in resolving water right disputes. In addition, thoughtful evaluation may suggest
changes in public policies and institutions to facilitate more efficient
resolution of conflicts.
The article begins with a discussion of the economic functions of
water rights adjudication in a setting in which decisions potentially
affected by adjudication proceedings face multiple uncertainties.
Next, the article presents a conceptual framework for evaluating the
costs and benefits of adjudications, including practical matters such as
evaluation criteria and collection of data to support future analyses.
Finally, the article briefly summarizes the existing literature on adjudication costs and benefits, concluding with recommendations for evaluating adjudication processes and for enhancing the cost-benefit tradeoffs of these proceedings.
II. ADJUDICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC
DECISIONS AND PERVASIVE UNCERTAINTY
Adjudications are intended to reduce uncertainties in the quantity
and priority of water rights. In principle, this can facilitate economic
development that requires reliable supplies; allow all parties and water
administrators to plan better for the future; separate real water claims
from "paper water"; and quantify federal, Indian and other reserved

13.

See NICK HANLEY & CLIVE SPASH, COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 4

(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 1993).
14. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, sec. 2 (Feb. 17, 1981).
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rights, reducing
this specific source of uncertainty for water right
15
claimants.
Although their objectives are well appreciated, adjudications are
not without critics. 1 Even successful adjudications face limited ability
to address risk, as courts only seek to define specific characteristics of7
rights, not the policies that guide future changes in use of rights.
Ambiguous and changing state, federal, and tribal policies are a key
source of risk to right holders even when rights themselves are welldefined. A host of other uncertainties result from regional hydrology
and climate, changing economic conditions, agency actions taken under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") or Clean Water Act ("CWA'),
and changing political administrations. Adjudications attempt to reduce one specific source of uncertainty in a context beset by multiple
risks.
While improved certainty has been a central objective of adjudications, economic decisions routinely proceed in the face of uncertainty.
The risks inherent in stock market and real estate investments are just
a few of many potential examples. As always in the field of economics,
the issue is tradeoffs. There are costs of achieving greater certainty
and there are costs of proceeding with economic decisions in the face
of uncertainty. Legitimate differences of opinion exist as to the proper
role of government in reducing risk for the public and the private sectors. Various government agencies are involved in a diverse array of
risk-related policies such as vehicle airbag regulations, airport security,
drought assistance for farmers, limits on arsenic concentrations in
drinking water, and truth-in-lending regulations. In this broad context, the debate over adjudications can be seen as part of a larger debate on the appropriate level of public investment in reducing risk.
In the case of water, the risks associated with ill-defined rights significantly affect both the public and private sectors. Economic decisions that adjudications are likely to affect include water acquisitions
for various purposes such as implementing water settlements involving
Native American tribes or multiple states, assuring flows for recreation

and environmental needs, and securing reliable dry year supplies for
cities and industry. Water rights ambiguities also affect decisions to
15.

See, e.g.,

NORMAN K. JOHNSON, WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, INDIAN WATER

(1983) (estimating a total potential reserved rights claim of
about 46 million acre-feet of water per year by Indian tribes in the western states).
16. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion ofFinality in General Water Rights Adjudications, 25
IDAHO L. REv. 271, 272-73 (1989); Scott B. McElroy &JeffJ. Davis, Revisiting Colorado
River Water ConservationDistrict v. United States - There Must Be a Better Way, 27 Ariz. St. L.
J. 597, 648 (Summer 1995); Frances Levine, Dividing the Water: The Impact of Water Rights
Adjudication on New Mexican Communities, 32J. SW. 268, 268-69 (Autumn 1990).
17. Adjudicators usually take a narrow view of their role. Setting the quantity, priority and other essential elements of a water right is the statutory burden adjudications
carry. Any further involvement transgresses the separation of powers doctrine.
RIGHTS IN THE WEST 93
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invest in water storage, treatment, and delivery infrastructure. These
decisions are crucial to states, cities, counties, tribes, private firms, and
non-profit organizations across the West. Moreover, water rights affect
multiple public interests such as endangered species and municipal
water supply reliability. Pervasive public agency involvement and expenditures substantially affect taxpayers.,8
In recognition of the substantial public interests at stake, the federal government developed principles and standards for evaluating
water projects. 9 The U.S. Department of Interior also created guidelines for Indian water settlements. 20 The Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB") plays a critical role in reviewing proposed water projects and tribal settlements and OMB has consistently opposed settlements on fiscal grounds, recommending a presidential veto in the case
of the majority of settlements.2' The political power of states and their
congressional delegations has driven administrative approval of settlements, overcoming OMB objections. Similarly, despite the existence of
cost-benefit standards22 to evaluate proposed water development projects, approval of these projects hinged heavily on political matters
It is important to acknowlrather than objective economic analysis.
edge that politics often trumps analytical findings when developing
systematic economic analysis for the evaluation of adjudications.

M.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC
EVALUATION OF ADJUDICATIONS

Assessing the benefits and costs of water rights adjudications is not
a simple undertaking, even though the science of benefit-cost analysis
has advanced over several decades from its early application to examining infrastructure projects such as construction of highways and reservoirs. It is worth asking why one might take the trouble to conduct a
18.

For more information on the role of Cost-Benefit analyses in federal projects,

see generally U.S.

WATER

RESOURCES

COUNCIL,

ECONOMIC AND

ENVIRONMENTAL

PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES IMPLEMENTATION

(1983), [hereinafter PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES] (discussing the costs and
benefits of water resources development alternatives and providing more information
on the role of benefit-cost analyses in federal projects); Maynard M. Hufschmidt, BeneSTUDIES iii

fit-Cost Analysis: 1933-1985, WATER RESOURCES UPDATES: REFLECTIONS
WATER SCIENCE AND POLICY: ISSUE NO. 166, Mar. 2000, at 42; Warren

Overview of President Carter'sWater Policy (1978), 3
19.

ENVIRON. MGT.

ON A CENTURY OF

Viessman, Jr., An
189 (1979).

See 42 U.S.C. § 1962a-2 (2000) (establishing principles, standards, and proce-

dures for federal projects).
20. See Criteria and Procedures for Indian Water Rights Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg.
9223 (Mar. 12, 1990); see also BONNIE G. COLBY, JOHN E. THORSON & SARAH BRITrON,
NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST 38 (2005).
21. COLBY, THORSON & BRrrrON, supra note 20, at 38, 60-61.
22. See generally PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra notel8, at iii.
23. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL WATER POLICY
INITIATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 95-347, at 1 (1978).
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systematic evaluation? After all, establishing an evaluation framework
and collecting and analyzing data is not itself a costless process.
Perhaps the strongest rationale for establishing such a framework is
to inform the creation of more effective processes for accomplishing
adjudication objectives. Documentation can also help guide the appropriate level of public and private investment in these lengthy and
expensive processes. At minimum, it would be useful to gauge how
cumulative expenditures on water rights adjudications compare to the
value of the water assets being adjudicated. In those regions where
water rights have high financial value and adjudication costs represent
a modest fraction of that value adjudications may be considered a reasonable "cost of doing business." Likewise, it would be useful to identify areas where adjudication costs are high and significantly out of
proportion to the value of water rights.
"Effectiveness" refers to achieved results relative to the time, money
and other expended resources. 4 The importance of assessing the effectiveness of adjudications has been intensifying. Those who bear the
costs, particularly in the public sector, desire result based accountability that requires adjudication programs to provide evidence about what
they aim to achieve and the results they have achieved.
A. COSTS
The adjudication costs that an informed analysis must consider are
generally more straightforward than adjudication benefits. Costs include ongoing financial expenditures by all parties, including the value
of staff and managerial time. These costs are borne by the taxpayers
through multiple avenues of public agency involvement and the operation of the court system, as well as by all of the parties to the proceeding. Other costs include time delays and uncertainties that affect water
management decisions, non-cooperative behavior among parties in
withholding useful technical information and failing to address regional water problems, and the stress and acrimony that may accompany court proceeding. If an adjudication is successful, many of these
costs will be reduced once the proceedings are well-established and
progressing.
Comprehensive cost data is difficult to collect because costs incurred by private parties are not public information and public agencies often do not systematically compile their incurred costs. Cost information can be categorized as: (1) costs to parties participating in
the process; (2) costs to the public including agencies, courts, and
24. Andy Rowe, Bonnie Colby, Michael Niemeyer, and Will Hall, Economic and
Environmental Effects of Environmental Conflict Resolution, Presented to the William
and Flora Hewlett Foundation (Dec. 2005).
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other costs paid through taxes; and (3) costs to others that are not participating in the process-and are not paying with tax dollars-such as
water utility ratepayers. Cost-benefit analysis of adjudications must
"count" expenditures of staff, time, money, resources, water, and other
assets as costs. It is important to carefully distinguish between costs
attributable to the adjudication and more general costs that would
have occurred anyway. The analysis must only include those costs that
are attributable to the adjudication process.
Transaction costs are a special consideration that, as contemplated
by this paper, relates to the effect of adjudications on water transactions. Transaction costs are information, contracting, and enforcement costs, including verifying water rights and regulatory requirements, gathering data on compliance, assessing and collecting of penalties, and monitoring the condition of the water resources that are the
subject of the transaction. Transaction costs may arise from public
policies that require stakeholders to follow specific procedures, such as
state agency review of proposed changes in water rights.2 5 In principle,
a successful adjudication will reduce future transaction costs of transferring water rights by providing increased certainty. However, during
the period that the adjudication is active, transaction costs may well
increase due to heightened levels of scrutiny of proposed water right
changes by other claimants and by management agencies.26 Eliminating transaction costs is neither feasible nor desirable. The goal is a
balancing of the costs of improving certainty with the benefits of that
certainty. Transaction costs are part of the "price" of having transferable private property rights in a resource with pervasive public interests
and community implications.
The most compelling category of costs is particularly elusive to describe and quantify. An "opportunity cost" is not a direct expense paid
out of someone's pocket. Rather, it is an opportunity-or flow of expected benefits-that is given up in order to obtain something else.
For instance, the use of state and federal agency staff time to support
adjudication proceedings could have instead gone towards implementation of water conservation programs. Monies that irrigation districts
expend on adjudication could instead go towards modernization of the
district's water conveyance infrastructure. Urban water suppliers could
spend their adjudication budgets on acquiring water rights instead.
All expenditures of time and money have an opportunity cost-the
sacrifice of alternative accomplishments that could have been secured.
With respect to adjudications, opportunity cost considerations pose the
25. See generally Bonnie G. Colby, Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water
Allocation, 72 AM.J. AGRIC. ECON. 1184 (Dec. 1990)
26. Charles T. DuMars, Some Thoughts on the Future of Water Rights Adjudications in
Western Water Law, in ABA 25th Annual Water Law Conference Materials 7 (ABA 25th
Annual Water Law Conference Feb. 23, 2007).
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question: Is there some more effective process and/or goal that could
be accomplished with the resources being expended on adjudications?
Table 1: Adjudication Costs
" Expenditures of money and time
" Delayed problem-solving, resource degradation
" Delayed investment, foregone returns
" Opportunity costs - what could we have done instead with $ expended?
Table 2: Parties Who Bear Adjudication Costs
" Costs to parties (claimants)
" Costs to public agencies and taxpayers
" Costs to "others" (rate payers, instream flow beneficiaries)
B.

BENEFITS

The potential benefits of an adjudication are difficult to identify
precisely, even harder to quantify, and are dependent upon the effectiveness of the adjudication in accomplishing its objectives. The economic benefits of reducing uncertainties in water rights depend on the
extent to which uncertainty is reduced and the financial value of the
rights. The literature on valuing water rights has evolved substantially
in the last fifteen years.2 7 Economic values, generally expressed in
terms of per acre-foot, can be estimated, even in regions where there
are no active market transactions. The higher the economic value of
water, the greater the financial returns from reducing uncertainty over
water rights.
27. See e.g., James F. Booker & Bonnie G. Colby, Competing Water Uses in the Southwestern US.: Valuing Drought Damages, 31 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 877 (1995); David S.
Brookshire et al, Market Pricesfor Water in the Semi-Arid West of the United States, 40 WATER
RESOURCES RES. W09S04 (Sept. 2004); Bonnie G. Colby, Applying Fair Market Value Concepts to Water Rights, 18 REAL EST. ISSUES 8 (1993); Bonnie G. Colby, Estimating the Value

of Water in Alternative Uses, in ECONOMICS OF WATER RESOURCES: INSTITUTIONS,
INSTRUMENTS AND POLICIES FOR MANAGING ScARcITy 3 (K. William Easter & Mary E.
Renwick eds., 2004); Bonnie G. Colby & Steve Wishart, Quantifying the Influence of Desert
RiparianAreas on Residential Property Values, 70 APPRAISALJ. 304 (2002); Bonnie G. Colby,
Recent Trends in Southwestern Water Values, 59 APPRAISAL J. 488 (1991) [hereinafter
Southwestern Water Values]; Bonnie G. Colby et al., Water Right Transactions:Market Values
and Price Dispersion, 29 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1565 (June 1993) [hereinafter Water
Right Transactions];Julie Leones et al., MeasuringRegionalEconomic Impacts of Streamflow
Depletions, 33 WATER RESOURCES RES. 831 (Apr. 1997); STEVEN J. HERZOG, GUIDELINES
FOR THE APPRAISAL OF WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA,

ES-3 to ES-12 (prepared for U.S.

Fish
and
Wildlife
Service,
September
2006),
available
at
http://www.fws.gov/cno/fisheries/docs/Guidelines%20for%2Appraisal%20of% 20W
ater%20Rights.pdf.
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An adjudication that successfully resolves uncertainty over water
rights may lead to improved regional economic output and productivity, enhanced ability to plan for growth, endangered species recovery,
improvements in water dependent habitat, and recreation opportunities. In addition, there may be better cooperation amongst jurisdictions
and stakeholders, improved organizational morale and credibility, increased confidence in the system to solve problems, and decreased
anxiety and tension.
One tangible benefit of a successful adjudication is to enable
straightforward enforcement of water rights in times of shortage. As A.
Dan Tarlock has noted, many areas of the West have little history of
enforcing a priority system and cutting off junior users.28 However,
enforcement of priorities will become more commonplace and necessary as the effects of climate change unfold. Feller has noted extensive
costs and delays endured by a prominent senior right holder in central
Arizona attempting to curtail upstream juniors in the midst of a slow
and cumbersome ongoing adjudication.2
Other benefits from an effective adjudication can be conceptualized in standard economic terms that consider adaptation to risk. For
simplicity, assume that the water right characteristics of central interest
to claimants are the mean yield of the right in "average" hydrologic
years and the variance around this mean in dry years.
Suppose the adjudication succeeds in reducing the variance
around the mean yield so that a claimant can know with more certainty
the lowest yield of the right in foreseeable hydrologic circumstances.
Economists have developed the concept of a "risk premium"-a willingness to pay to reduce risk-in this case to reduce the variance in the
yield of a water right.3° The risk premium is larger when the economic
consequences of the variance in water right yield are higher. For instance, a farmer growing high-profit specialty crops would have a
higher willingness to pay to reduce uncertainty than a farmer growing
less profitable crops. Risk premiums increase as water rights become
more financially valuable. Climate change is likely to increase water
demand in agricultural and urban sectors due to the effect of higher
temperatures on evapo-transpiration in crops and urban landscapes.
Climate change is also likely to increase the variance around the his-

28.

See Dan Tarlock, General Stream Adjudications: A Good Public Investment?, 133

CONTEMP. WATER REs.

J.

& EDUC. 52, 56 (2006).

29. see alsoJoseph M. Feller, The Adjudication That Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 ARIz. L.
REv. 405 (2007).
30.
See W. DOUGLASS SHAW, WATER RESOURCE ECONOMICS AND POLICY: AN
INTRODUCTION 185 (2005).
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toric mean water yield for water rights, due to increased temperature,
3
reduced winter snowpack, and more erratic precipitation events.

The value to the right holder of eliminating uncertainty in yield
during dry years is the maximum they would pay to eliminate the variance and be assured of the average yield under all hydrologic conditions. Rationally, this dollar amount has an upper limit. There is a cost
of achieving certainty for a specific water right at which the right
holder would rather adapt to the existing uncertainty through acquiring additional, also uncertain, rights, investing in storage facilities, water banking, etc. In fact, the willingness to pay to reduce uncertainty in
water supply portfolios has motivated many of the water3 2 transactions
undertaken by cities, businesses, and agricultural districts.
The clearest benefit that has emerged from actual adjudications is
the incentive that the costly morass of the process creates for negotiated settlements. Thorson et al. cite these settlements as the single
33
most evident accomplishment of adjudications. However, one must
inquire whether a less costly and cumbersome process could induce
such settlements.
An analogy from the transportation sector is in order here. If
roads become sufficiently congested in the central part of a city, then
commuters, weighing the tradeoffs, will opt for more use of public
transportation. Without the excessive delays of congested, this shift
might never happen. However, significant cumulative costs accrue as
congestion increases. The same incentives to switch to public transit
could have been created instead by a tax on driving into the center of
the city, with tax revenues used to provide a superb public transit system.
In the same way, it is conceivable that a carefully designed system of
fees for claiming and holding water rights could reproduce the incentives to negotiate a settlement that slow, costly, and uncertain adjudications generate. Trivial and unsubstantiated claims will decline as these
claimants will no longer find it worthwhile to maintain an active claim.
However, urban traffic congestion reaches a costly stage before significant investments are made in public transit because no elected body is
willing to levy a driving fee unless dire circumstances are evident. This
same inertia applies to the water policy arena. The imposition of user
fees per unit of water consumed (for agricultural and urban users),
along with substantive fees for holding water rights and participating in
31.

WORKING GROUP II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE

CHANGE 2001: IMPAcTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILrIY 742-43, 745 (2001), available at

http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wg2/index.htm.
32. See Water Right Transactions,supra note 27, at 1565-72 (discussing market transactions involving a scarce resource); Southwestern Water Values, supra note 27, at 488-500
(discussing the development and trends of the water market in the southwest United

States).
33. See Thorson et al., supra note 12, at 355.
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adjudications could substantially reduce many water problems. Those
parties with relatively low economic returns from their water use and
their ownership of rights would release their water for other purposes.
Political antipathy to imposing new fees, legitimate equity considerations, and jurisdictional tangles make this approach difficult to implement. Moreover, prior court decisions limit the manner in which
such fees can be imposed.4 Nevertheless, even modest fees linked to
the quantity claimed would be a beginning in creating appropriate
incentives.3 5
C. THE COUNTERFACTUAL - CONSTRUCTING "WITH AND WITHOUT"

SCENARIOS
An important aspect of a benefit cost assessment is the counterfac-

tual, constructing the baseline against which the adjudication will be
assessed. This requires identifying a clear counterfactual-what would
take place in the absence of the adjudication process? Evaluation of
adjudications must explicitly consider alternative processes and compare the results achieved through adjudication to those that each alternative counterfactual-the likely process and outcome absent adjudication-would have achieved. Among the questions that an analysis
must address are: Would the ambiguities in water rights have continued without any resolution? Would a different water rights clarification process have occurred? Case-by-case litigation of rights seems a
natural baseline for a comprehensive adjudication. However, there are
many difficulties with using litigation as a baseline. 6
First, adjudication, piecemeal litigation, and other processes are
not mutually exclusive options. All of these processes require collection and analysis of technical information, preparing positions and
analyzing tradeoffs among different outcomes. Which costs should be
assigned to which process? Litigation often provides the incentives
necessary for negotiated agreements to be achieved. In addition, different processes generate different "products" such that comparison of
costs alone would neglect potentially large differences in the benefits
generated by negotiation versus litigation to the various parties. An
administrative water rights hearing and ruling may constitute the most
realistic baseline. Still, one must conjecture regarding the length, costliness, and outcome of such a hearing. There is a dearth of closely
comparable cases that have been addressed by different processes and

34.

See e.g., U.S. v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1 (1993).

35. For fee purposes, the consumptive use quantity of the claim would be most
relevant and instream flow claims would need to be assessed in a different manner.
36.

See GAIL BINGHAM,
128-32 (1986).
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have been carefully documented such that rigorous comparisons can
be made.
A systematic assessment of adjudications must clearly define the
counterfactual in order to determine what difference the adjudication
process made in comparison to the most likely outcome absent the
adjudication. Results-based accountability requirements direct programs to assess this difference. Economists refer to this as the incremental contribution, or marginal net benefit when measured in dollars. This is a central question of program evaluation-what difference
did the program make?
The analytical goal is to identify effects that the evaluated adjudication process specifically caused. Effects due to the adjudication are
those that would not have occurred without it. This is the "with and
without" principle-attributing to the adjudication only those effects
that would not have occurred in absence of the adjudication. 37 It is

essential to separate the economic effects of general regional changes
in resource use and management from impacts which are properly
attributable to the process being evaluated. Professional judgment
calls are inevitable in attempting to isolate the impacts of adjudication
from other events that affect water resources in the region.
In previous studies of similarly complex multi-party processes, researchers have asked parties to identify their preferred alternative to
the process being evaluated. "Candidate counterfactuals" may consist
of prior and/or concurrent processes used by parties, alternatives used
elsewhere to address similar issues with a different process, and constructed alternatives-plausible and likely processes that could have
been used but were not. The counterfactual must be credible to the
parties and to professionals involved, as well as to agencies concerned
with results-based accountability.38
Thorson et al. highlighted several likely alternatives to general
stream adjudications. As one alternative, significant changes could be
made in the role of the federal and state governments with respect to
federal reserved rights. s9 The federal government could take action to:
give deference to state law, inventory or quantify reserved rights,
4
amend the McCarran Amendment, or adjudicate in federal court. 0
Early versions of the Western Water Rights Settlement Act, proposed in
195641 would have required the government to declare when it was reserving water, compensate states when federal rights affected state

37. See JOHN B. LOOMIS, INTEGRATED PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS TO NATIONAL FORESTS, PARKS, WILDLIFE REFUGES, AND BLM LANDS 158-60
(2d ed. Columbia University Press 2002).
38. SeeD'ESTRkE&COLBY, supra note 12, at x.
39.

Thorson et al., supra note 12, at 464.

40.

Id. at 464-70.

41.

S. 863, 84th Cong. (1956).
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rights, and guarantee reserved rights would not affect rights established before the creation of the reservations. A number of amendments have been proposed to McCarran. Michael White recommended changing general requirements to allow a "straight-forward
determination of federal water rights," and charging the federal government for litigation.2 Crapo introduced a bill that would have required the United States to abide by state laws and fees when appropriating water, to abide by the same laws as individuals in seeking water
rights, and to waive sovereign immunity in certain cases.43 Section 2(c)
in the bill denied that the reservation of lands by the United States
guaranteed water with the designation.4 4
McElroy and Davis recommend the adjudication of Indian rights in
federal courts, citing the small number of Indian adjudications completed by state courts.45 They believe that federal court would provide
the speediest fair trial. 46 Federal courts were involved in the Klamath
Tribe Adair litigation in Oregon. 4' The district court recognized reserved rights
for fishing and other uses but let the state court quantify
48
the rights.

As another strategy, administrative inventories could be pursued
instead of judicial proceedings. The Public Land Law Review Commission gave recommendations for handling federal and Indian reserve
rights in the early 1970s. They proposed a plan where federal land
agencies would "ascertain and give notice of their projected water requirements for the next 40 years for reserved areas ...

Additional

protections would also be in place to protect states against conflicting
rights or rights created in the future. 5°
The National Water Commission advocated a different approach.
Existing and future federal reserved rights would be established, recorded, and quantified in accordance with state laws. The Commission
recommended an inventory and recording of Indian reserve rights in
state records regardless of whether or not adjudications would be nec-

42.

Michael D. White, McCarranAmendment Adjudications-Problems,Solutions, Alterna-

tives, 22 LAND & WATERL. REv. 619, 628-29 (1987).
43. S. 561,108th Cong. §§ 3(a), 3(b)(2)(A), 5 (2003).
44.
45.
trict v.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. § 2(c).
Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water Conservation DisUnited States - There Must Be a Better Way, 27 ARiz. ST.L.J. 597, 648 (1995).
Id.
United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1397, 1399.
U.S. PuB. LAND LAw REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD Or THE NATION'S LAND: A
Interestingly, Senator
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 147 (1970).

McCarran proposed such an inventory as part of his bill in 1951. See S. Rep. No. 82-755
at 1-2 (1951). The inventory proposal did not pass the Senate.
50. Id. at 147-149.
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essary as a means to inform other water users. 1 In the event that Indian rights displaced local water right holders, the commission recommended either the federal government lease up to the entire Indian water right, compensate displaced right holders, or supply the
displaced water through alternative means.52
Various proposals would have required federal agencies prepare
detailed inventories of all water rights in each state.53 Carter's water
policy statement in 1978 required administrative inventory of all nonIndian reserved rights based on actual needs "rather than theoretical
or hypothetical needs based on full legal extension of
all possible
55
rights. 54 This plan was vague in respect to Indian rights.
Legislative quantification has been considered as an alternative to
adjudications. There have been repeated efforts to induce Congress to
quantify Indian water rights. For example, in 1977, Carter's appointed
Federal Reserved Water Rights Task Force recommended legislation,
which was subsequently introduced in the House of Representatives
that year, that would assign priority dates and quantify existing Indian
reserve rights. 5" The determinations would be based on reservation
date and past five years water use.57 The bill did not address undeveloped Indian rights.
Regional settlements and negotiated agreements could become the
primary process. Indian water right settlements in the West have been
moving forward although states and tribes generally feel that the federal government is not contributing resources on the level it should. 8
Former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt advised tribes to coop51. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 477-78 (1973).
52. Id. at 481-83.
53. A similar proposal in 1974 recommended that the inventory and quantification
should occur by a neutral federal agency independent of the Department of Interior
and Department of Justice. This agency or commission would include some Indian
representatives, water scholars, and resource planners. Susan Millington Campbell,
Note, A Proposalfor the Quantification of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
1299, 1320 (1974); see also Walter Kiechel, Jr. & Kenneth J. Burke, Federal-StateRelations
in Water Resources Adjudication and Administration:Integration of Reserved Rights With AppropriativeRights, 18 ROCKV MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 531, 538 (1973) (arguing that quantification of reserved rights by administrative process is a better approach).
54. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND INDIAN
RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN NEED OF RESOLUTION app.II (1978) [here-

inafter GAO REPORT].
55. Id.
56. H.R. 9951, 95th Cong. (1977).
57. H.R. 9951, 95th Cong. (1977).
58. See Bonnie G. Colby, What Makes Water Settlements Successful?, in TRIBAL WATER
RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 171,

173

(John E.

Thorson et al. eds., 2006) (noting that non-federal parties bear a significant portion of
settlement costs); see also DANIEL McCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN
WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA 31, 48-49 (2002) (noting the time
involved in the passage of various settlement acts).
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erate in settling Indian water claims. 59 Others have proposed regional
settlements. The Arizona Water Settlements Act of 2004, which involved the Gila River Indian Community's rights, the State of New Mexico's fights, and the Bureau of Reclamation's bill for the Central Arizona Project, is an example of a regional settlement. 6 The creation of
an Indian Water Rights Commission appointed by the President has
also been suggested to draft model water agreements. 6' The Commission would make guidelines for the different stages of adjudication. 2 A
surcharge on reclamation63 projects could fund its operation and some
of its settled agreements.
One example of an alternative model is CALFED, created out of
the Bay-Delta Accord of 1994.6 This intergovernmental agency is a
collaborative effort between the State of California, the Federal government, and numerous other signatories. Another example of an
alternative model is the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan
(CERP), authorized under the Water Resources Development Act of
2000. 65 It is important to note that the threat of lengthy, uncertain,
and expensive litigation motivates carefully crafted regional agreements, but that even established settlements are fraught with uncertainty. For instance, former Interior Secretary Babbitt worked hard
under his administration to establish that "a deal is a deal." 66 This encouraged major efforts to complete habitat conservation plans under
the Endangered Species Act. 67 However, the "no surprises" policy itself
is under challenge in district court in Washington D.C. 68 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") has re-opener clauses in its li-

59. Keith Bagwell, Babbitt to Indians: Unity May Aid Water Fight,ARIz. DAILY STAR, Mar.
19, 1997, at 2B.
60. S. 437, 108th Cong., 118 Stat. 3478 (2004).
61. Lloyd Burton, The American Indian Water Rights Dilemma: Historical Perspective and Dispute-Settling Policy Recommendations, 7 UCIAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'v 1, 4749 (1987).
62. Id. at 50.
63. Id. at 54.
64. The Bay-Delta Accord, signed in 1994, set forth principles towards the implementation of a permanent Bay-Delta protection plan. Among its complex provisions,
the agreement sets water quality standards, requires the state to conduct water rights
proceedings, and specifies that compliance with the "take" provisions of the Endangered Species Act is not intended to result in any additional loss of water supply. To
meet that goal, the Accord allows for operational flexibility, developed through a state
and federal operations group. The parties also agreed to fund ecosystem restoration,
including water and habitat purchases.
See CALFED Delta-Bay Program,
http://www.calwater.ca.gov/AboutCalfed/ (last visited March 20, 2007).
65. Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 601, 114 Stat. 2572, 2680 (2000).
66. See Peter Sly, Address at ABA 22nd Annual Water Law Conference: Environmental Water Settlements: Can We Make a Deal? (Feb. 19, 2004).
67. See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg.
8859 (February 23, 1998); see also Donald C. Baur & Karen L. Donovan, The No Surprises
Policy: Contracts 101 Meets the EndangeredSpecies Act, 27 ENVTL. L. 767, 767 (Fall 1997).
68. Spirit of the Sage v. Babbitt, No. 98-CV-01873-EGS (D. D.C. filedJuly 29, 1998)
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censes for hydroelectric projects and this uncertainty impels FERC lisuch conservation groups, to seek
censees and other stakeholders,
69
binding regulatory agreements.
Other suggestions for simplifying adjudications include: limiting
the number of necessary parties, allowing states to represent nonIndian users, and allowing class action procedures. ° John Leshy, former Solicitor of the United States Department of the Interior, suggested a focus on improved relations between federal and state governments, including agreements for federal agencies and states to notify each other promptly in the case of proposed water right changes
and to cooperation on research initiatives.
Identifying appropriate counterfactuals to compare adjudications is
challenging, but not impossible. A study conducted by Rowe et al. assumed that complex environmental disputes were highly unique, and
this would prevent identification of a good counterfactual. However,
Rowe et al. found that highly complex environmental disputes can
have good naturally occurring counterfactuals. v This study suggested
construction of a counterfactual for comparison when environmental
disputes were unique in the sense that an observed alternative was not
present. Rowe found that the use of observed and constructed alternatives together, when placed before an expert science panel to compare
effects of the process under evaluation to both alternatives, maximized
effectiveness.7 3 This method greatly enhanced cross-case comparisons
and may be an efficient approach to learning from complex processes.
D. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON ADJUDICATION COSTS, BENEFITS

Below, this article summarizes the existing anecdotal literature on
costs associated with adjudications for each state in which information
is readily available.
Adjudication of all Montana water rights issued prior to July 1,
1973 began in 1979. TM As of 2004, six decrees have been finalized out
69. See generally, Michael A. Swiger et al., Payingfor the Change: Can the FERC Force
Dam Decommissioning at Relicensing? 17 ENERGY L.J. 163 (1996) (reprinted in the ABA
18th Annual Water Law Conference materials) (discussing the impact of FERC hydroelectric dam decommissioning on the property interests of hydropower licensees).
70. See, e.g., Miller v. Jennings, 243 F.2d 157, 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1957) (noting the
limited circumstances in which a court may join the United States as a party defendant
in a water rights lawsuit and the importance of including all water claimants in a water
rights adjudication, whether members of a class or parties thereto).
71. John D. Leshy, U.S. Department of Interior, Discussion Draft, Memorandum of
Understanding, Nov. 21, 1994; see also Thorson et al., supra note 14, at 472-73.
72. Rowe et al., supranote 24.
73. Id.
74. Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Comm., White Paper on the Montana
Water Rights Adjudication 3 (Mar. 2, 2004), http://water.montana.edu/watersheds/pdfs/FinalAdjudiction WhitePaper 030204.pdf.
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of 219,413 water rights claims.75 There is no indication of when the
state will finish the adjudication. When the process began, the legislature estimated that one hundred full time positions would be necessary
to complete it within ten years. 6 The funding that the legislature provided was inadequate so the process has been slow, even though the
State of Montana has spent over $37.5 million dollars." This estimate
does not include costs to individuals or economic losses due to uncertainty in land and water transactions.78
The Gila River water adjudication began in 1974, 79 and its end is
nowhere in sight."O By the mid-1990s Arizona had spent an estimated
$100 million on adjudications including costs to the Department of
Water Resources and lawyers' fees.81 Idaho spent around $68 million
from 1980-2003.2 Estimates place Wyoming's litigation expenses up to
1993 at $20 million. 3 The state of Texas spent around $10 million on

75. Id. "While six decrees are issued which DRNC describes as 'final,' they will have
to be re-opened, so, arguably, even those 'final' decrees are not truly final." Id. at 2, n.
2 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-237 (2005) (titled reopening and review of decrees)).
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id. at 1.
78. Id. The Steering Committee's 1991 statutory mandate included drafting a water
management plan for the basin, which the Committee completed in December 1994.
In 1995, the mandate was changed to include implementing and revising the initial
plan. See MONT.

CODE ANN.

§ 85-2-238 (2005);

see also UPPER CLARK FORK RIVER BASIN

(December
2004), available at http://dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water mgmt/montana state waterplan/
pdfs/upper clarkforkriverbasin watermngmt plan.pdf.
79. See United States v. County of Maricopa (San Carlos Apache Tribe), 697 P.2d
658, 661-64 (1985); see also Feller, supra note 29. Petitioners filed the case before the
Arizona State Land Department, which transferred it to the Maricopa County Superior
Court in 1979, when Arizona amended applicable statutes to require that parties bring
stream adjudications in the Superior Courts. San CarlosApache Tribe, 697 P.2d at 663-64.
80. The Arizona Supreme Court observed in 1985, "The case has been pending
more than ten years and may well take another twenty for decision." San CarlosApache
Tribe, 697 P.2d at 662. The court underestimated the time that the case would require,
as did the Arizona Department of Water Resources in predicting that the required
Comprehensive Report on the Adjudication would be completed in 1996 or 1997. See
STEERING COMM., UPPER CLARK FORK RIVER BASIN: WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN

DONALDJ. GROSS, STATUS REPORT: GENERAL ADJUDICATION OF THE GILA RIVER SYSTEM AND
SOURCE 63, 70 (1988).
81. Thorson et al., supra note 12, at 432; see also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL MASTER,
GENERAL STREAM ADJUDICATION BULLETIN, October 1996, available at
http://supreme.state.az.us/waternews/issue/oct96.htm (discussing Indian tribe claims
for attorneys fees).
82.
Memorandum from Krista Lee Evans to Envtl. Quality Council 2 (Feb. 23,
2004), available at http://leg.state.mt.us/content/lepo/2003 2004/environmental
quality council/staffmemos/adjudication funding.pdf.
83. Teno Roncalio, The Big Horns of a Dilemma, in INDIAN WATER IN THE NEW WEST
209,211 (Thomas R. McGuire et al eds., 1993).
ARIZONA
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court costs and attorney fees to complete its surface water adjudication. 4
Determining the total costs of adjudications to all parties is complicated and has led to speculation that a comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis would reveal benefits insufficient to justify the costs. While
studies conducted to date shed light on the magnitude and types of
costs, there have not been any systematic comparisons of adjudication
costs with the potential cost of likely alternative processes.
The high cost of extended adjudications has caused litigants to call
on state legislators for reform. In Idaho and Arizona, efforts to reduce
costs by changing adjudication statutes have not been successful due to
legal challenges and costs brought on by the proposed changes.85 High
costs have had an additional side effect in Idaho. The federal government challenged Idaho's fee structure because of a $10 million fee assessment. 6 The United States Supreme Court decided the case against
Idaho.8 7 As a result, the federal government-a large land owner and
water user in Idaho-will not have to pay filing fees for the Snake River
Basin Adjudication.8
Sources of funding to cover state court and agency adjudication
costs differ across states. Some western states provide annual appropriations for agencies that bear the cost of adjudications, related hydrologic study, and notices. In Montana, funding also comes in the
form of special revenue funds 89 coupled with water right fees. 90 Other
states use filing fees to defray to costs of adjudication. South Dakota, 9'
92
Washington, 92 and Nevada 93 all require claimants to pay filing fees ranging from $25 to $100.

84. Doug Caroom & Paul Elliot, Water Rights Adjudication - Texas Style, 44 TEX. B.J.
1183,1184 (1981).
85. Arizona's legislature amended its adjudication statute in 1995 with H.B. 2276,
signed into law on March 17, 1995. The United States and several Indian tribes challenged the Arizona legislature's 1995 amendments to its adjudication statute in state
court. See Press Release, United States Dep't of Justice Env't and Natural Res. Div.,
State Court Strikes Down Amendments to Arizona Water Adjudication Statute: Decision Insures Laws Governing Water Rights Applied Fairly (Sept. 9, 1996), available at
Idaho's
legislature
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1996/Sept96/435enr.htm.
amended its adjudication statute one year earlier, with the Act of April 12, 1994, chs.
454-55, 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 1443-91 (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1401-28
(2003)).
86. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
87. Id. at 8-9.
88. Id.
89. See Legislative Fiscal Div., Legislative Fiscal Report 2007 Biennium, at F-29, available
at http://leg.mt.gov/content/publications/fiscal/fr_-2007/fr_f/lf df.pdf.
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-276 (2005).
91. S.D. CODIFED LAws § 46-2-13 (2004).
92. WASH. REV. CODEANN. §§ 36.18.016(17), 90.03.180 (West 2006).
93. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.135(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
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The non-financial costs of adjudications are also substantial. The
case can bring about conflicts that can undo local cooperative agreements. 94 Some have argued that the acequia system in New Mexico

represents a cooperative effort that may be vulnerable to damage by
state adjudications. 5 The adversarial process also impedes the sharing
of technical information and cooperation in addressing regional water
problems. Based on the available evidence, there is little basis for determining whether negotiated settlements are less costly than adjudication processes.
E. DATA NEEDS

Systematic collection of data related to costs and benefits can further our collective learning. Ideally, an adjudication process should
specify reporting requirements for cost data as part of the process.
Such a program could ask parties to make monthly reports on their
expenses to a central repository, which could then compile and track
such information. This systematic reporting of benefits will be more
challenging-likely requiring a carefully designed survey and perhaps
follow up interviews. Nevertheless, better cost data would be a valuable
step forward. At minimum, it is valuable to be able to compare adjudication expenditures to the financial value of water rights and determine whether costs are reasonable when compared to the value of
what is being adjudicated. 96
Perhaps the effort most analogous to systematic benefit-cost analysis of adjudications is a series of studies evaluating resolution of environmental disputes in the western United States. A pilot study that
began in 1998 instructed case researchers to rely only on publicly available sources to evaluate resolution of each case based on twenty-six

94. See generally Charlotte Benson Crossland, Acequia Rights in Law and Tradition, 32
J. Sw. 278, 284-87 (1990) (discussing the effect of water rights adjudications on the
traditional water allocation methods of acequias in New Mexico); Frances Levine, Dividing the Water: The Impact of Water Rights Adjudication on New Mexican Communities,32 J.
Sw. 268, 269-70 (1990) (discussing the impact of water rights adjudications on the
traditional water sharing and reallocation practices of communities in New Mexico);
Frances Leon Quintana, Land, Water, and Pueblo-HispanicRelations in Northern New Mexico, 32J. Sw. 288, 288, 292 (1990) (discussing the historical collaboration between the
Puebloans and Hispanics to share water and the effects of current and future water
projects on this historical system of water allocation).
95. See, e.g., STANLEY CRAWFORD, MAYORDOMO: CHRONICLE OF AN ACEQUIA IN
NORTHERN NEW MExico 86 (1988).
96. Data on the financial value of water rights is available for most regions of the
western U.S., based on either comparable market transactions or on analysis of the
financial returns to water in alternative uses. See, e.g., Bonnie Colby, K. Crandall & D.
Bush, Water Right Transactions,Market Values and Price Dispersion, 29 WATER RESOURCES
REs. 1565-1572 (1993); Bonnie Colby, Southwestern Water Values and Market Activity, 59
APPRAISALJ. 488-500 (1991)
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criteria. 97 The study intended the reliance on accessible sources to test
whether it was possible to evaluate dispute resolution processes and
outcomes in a low cost and non-intrusive manner, without the use of
stakeholder interviews. 98
Results indicate that economic aspects can be difficult to assess
without obtaining additional information directly from stakeholders.
However, for conflicts involving the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") processes, economic data are available from Environmental
Assessments and Impact Statements. For conflicts involving expenditures of federal dollars, the Office of Management Budget, the General
Accounting Office, the Department of Interior's Office of Policy Analysis, and the Congressional Budget Office perform economic or financial assessments. Access to economic data varied substantially across
the pilot cases. In principle, expenditures by public agencies are public information. However, agencies rarely compile cost data in a systematic manner on a case-by-case basis. Expenditures by corporations
and non-profit organizations generally are not a matter of public record and are available at the discretion of the organization. Subsequent to the pilot study, several evaluations of environmental conflict
resolution provided valuable indicators of how systematic evaluation of
adjudications might be conducted. 99
F. WELL-DEFINED ACCOUNTING STANCE
Careful definition of accounting stance is a crucial analytic step in
evaluating adjudication. The accounting stance determines the
width-across time, layers of parties, and geographically-of any cost,
benefit, and other impact, analysis. In general, this definition should
include the geographic area encompassed by the adjudication plus
those parties that are substantially affected but are located outside the
geographic scope.
Here is an example of an explicit statement regarding accounting
stance for a hypothetical case: The adjudication on the Grand River
has been ongoing since the early 1970s. In this evaluation, we examine
the period 1985 to the present due to lack of reliable data from earlier
periods. The primary claimants are farmers, cities, and a mining company. Stream flows for boaters and anglers may be affected by the adjudication, but these constituencies do not hold water rights and are
direct participants in the adjudication. Consequently, we do not include boater and angler impacts in our detailed analysis. We count

97.
98.

d'Estr~e & Colby, supra note 12, at 64-65.
Id.

99. See, for instance, evaluation work sponsored by the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution, www.ecr.gov (last visited May 15, 2007).
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costs and benefits to federal and state taxpayers, attributable to agency
participation. Inadequate data is available to consider costs to participating cities and counties.
As the example illustrates, an evaluation must state clearly the time
period, the geographical area, and the range of parties that the anaylsis
will consider. There may be legitimate reasons for excluding some
time periods, regions, and parties-such as that they are not central to
the case, or there is limited information available-and these need to
be explained. The issue of whether to focus on local, regional, or national costs and benefits is one that researchers commonly encountered in benefit cost analysis. However, the selection of a time period
to cover is uniquely complicated for adjudications where many processes continue in varying forms over decades.
G. BENEFITS AND COSTS OVER TIME
With respect to accounting for benefits and costs over time,
economists have well-defined techniques for comparing benefits and
costs occurring at different points in time using net present values and
discounting procedures. However, one must estimate the longevity of
benefits that arise from an adjudication successfully resolving issues.
For instance, a successful adjudication may produce improved certainty
and better working relationships and information sharing among parties. Are these benefits assumed to grow or decay over time, to remain
robust or dissipate in the face of new conflicts?
IV. POTENTIAL CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING ADJUDICATIONS

Any evaluation process requires a clear definition of the criteria
against which a process is assessed. d'Estree and Colby offered a relatively comprehensive menu of criteria for evaluating dispute resolution
processes and outcomes.1°° Rowe et al., 2006, focused upon economic
and environmental aspects in evaluating dispute resolution processes
and outcomes. °1 A few criteria most likely to be relevant to evaluating
adjudications are summarized below.
The criterion "positive net benefits" examines whether the adjudication creates net benefits1 °2 for the parties that would not have been
available otherwise. 10 3 Voluntary, negotiated agreements satisfy this
100.
101.
102.
103.

See n'EsTRfE & COLBY, supranote 12, at 30.

Rowe et al., supranote 24.
"Net benefits" are benefits minus costs.
D'ESTRtE & COLBY, supra note 12, at 34 (calling this "perceived economic efficiency").
See also ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WrrHouT GMNG IN 56-61, 70-71 ( Bruce Patton ed., 1991) (utilizing the
concept of weighing benefits and costs in the "mutual gains" negotiation framework);
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, PAUL F. LEVY & JENNIFER THOMAS-LARMER, NEGOTIATING
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: HOW TO AVOID ESCALATING CONFRONTATION, NEEDLESS
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criterion for the signatory parties. If the agreement fails to provide
incentive beyond their most likely alternative for those who sign on,
they would decline to bind themselves to the agreement. 0 4 Adjudication outcomes, which do not require voluntary consent of the parties,
are unlikely to satisfy this criterion. In adjudications, net benefits may
arise from reducing or eliminating the costs associated with water right
ambiguities, from improvements in water management, and from better cooperation such as the sharing of information, technology, and
problem-solving capacities among the parties. As previously discussed,
many analytic challenges arise in documenting and quantifying various
adjudication costs and benefits.
The criterion "cost-effective implementation" considers costs of
implementation decisions coming from an adjudication court. When a
ruling sets specific requirements (e.g., a 10% increase in summer
stream flows for fish), this criterion asks whether compliance is
achieved in a cost-effective manner. Implementation costs are likely to
be higher under court rulings. Courts are not required to consider
costs in crafting their ruling, focusing instead on rights and consistency
with the existing body of law.

Nevertheless, stake holders must care-

fully weigh costs, taking into consideration the financial burdens on
adjudication participants, taxpayers, and property owners."'
Effective "incentive compatibility" means that the adjudication
process and rulings generate signals that assist, rather than obstruct,
successful implementation. Two specific elements of incentive compatibility in the adjudication context are incentives for compliance and
incentives for more efficient water use and conservation.
Rulings that incorporate economic incentives for compliance will
involve lower monitoring and enforcement costs than those that fail to
consider incentives. Compliance incentives can be in the form of penalties, with specific consequences for violations-and adequate money
and technical staff for monitoring and enforcement. High penalties
are not effective in inducing compliance if there is little monitoring
fines. 107
and therefore little probability of detection and imposition of
With respect to incentives for better resource management, adjudications may encourage water transactions. Market transactions create
incentives by providing a known market price for the resource being
traded-e.g., water rights. That established market price can signal
COSTS, AND UNNECESSARY LITIGATION 236-38, 273-74 (2001)

(applying mutual gains

negotiation to disputes with a process called "creating value" or converting zero sum
negotiations to positive sum negotiations).
104. A broader version of this criterion could inquire whether the outcome provides

net gains to the larger community and society, beyond the immediate signatories.
105. See DONALD L. HOROWITz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 34-35 (1977).

106. See id.
107. See SUSSKIND ETAL., supranote 103, at 212-13 (discussing economic sanctions in
enforcing environmental laws).
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resource users that water has value beyond their own immediate use of
it. For example, irrigators will realize that on-farm water conservation
may enable them to sell or lease the water no longer needed for irrigation and this opportunity provides an incentive for more efficient water
use. 108
Although judicial processes can send an incentive signal, courts
generally do not have jurisdiction to set water prices. The compliance
that the process encourages to the degree that violation will bring the
violator before the court and expose them to the attendant costs and
uncertainties, serve to improve the environment in which market
transactions occur more readily.
Charles DuMars has addressed the potential effects of adjudications on market transactions. 1°9 This article will add a few points to his
discussion. Market prices, negotiated between buyers and sellers, lie in
a bargaining space defined by the other options available to the buyer,
which determine the most the buyer could reasonably pay for a specific
water right, and the least the seller could reasonably accept based on
net financial returns they currently earn from owning the water rights
and the expected increase in the value of the water right over time.
Buyers' and sellers' negotiating skills and bargaining power determine
where, within this range, the negotiated price will fall. Transaction
costs resulting from ambiguity in water rights "chip away" at this bargaining space and make some transfers financially infeasible. °
Studies in the 1990s collected and analyzed primary data on costs
to applicants and objectors for proposed water transfers in several
states."' This article will briefly review the results to demonstrate that
transactions occur even when burdened with a range of transaction
costs. Costs include attorneys' fees, engineering studies and state
agency fees. The relevant costs are only those to get change applications approved by the state, and do not including the purchase of water, conveyance costs, engineering for diversion works, and other costs
of implementing the transfer and actually moving water to a new use.
Across Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Nevada, average applicants'
costs were 6-12% of the price paid for the water right being trans108. See TERRY L. ANDERSON

& PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE

PUMP 8-12 (1997); see also Bonnie G. Colby, Negotiated Transactions as Conflict Resolution
Mechanisms: Water Bargainingin the U.S. West, in MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND
PERFORMANCE 77, 79, 87, 89-91 (K. William Easter, Mark W. Rosegrant & Ariel Dinar
eds., 1998).
109. See DuMars, supranote 26.
110. See Bonnie G. Colby, Regulation, Imperfect Markets and Transaction Costs: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in Water Allocation, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
475, 483, 498-500 (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1995).
111. See generally DR. LAWRENCEJ. MACDONNELL, THE WATER TRANSFER PROCESS AS A
MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMANDS VOL. I, 1, 2 (Natural
Resources Law Center 1990) (discussing water transfer activities in six western states).
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ferred."12 The filing of an objection (protest) to1 3 a change in water right
application raised applicant costs substantially.
Colorado had much higher costs and much longer time delays to
approve a water right change application.1 1 4 These higher costs likely
are due to the fact that the Colorado cases involved a higher proportion of transfers that moved water out of agriculture, the most controversial type of transfer, and a higher proportion of surface water
change applications, which have more direct and immediate third
party impacts than with groundwater." 5 Moreover, water right prices
during the period of the study were much higher in Colorado than in
New Mexico and Utah."" Where water is more valuable, it is worth
spending more for a careful review of the transfer impacts.
There are multiple implications of the limited prior research on
transaction costs for the present discussion of adjudications. First,
market transactions occur in the presence of non-trivial costs and uncertainties. The state with the highest transaction costs also has the
most active market. Second, it is economically rational to spend more
on reducing water rights uncertainties in areas where water rights have
a comparatively high economic value. Third, the incentives that the
parties to an adjudication face are somewhat similar to those that applicants and objectors to water right changes face. Those parties with
large financial interests at stake will rationally expend more asserting
their rights and objecting to assertions by others. Those with a smaller
economic interest at stake will reasonably expend less. In this way, the
claimants themselves naturally balance the costs and benefits of participation in adjudication to some extent.
Another criterion with economic implications is "improved problem solving capacity." The stakeholders engaged in water conflicts often must address multiple problems over a period of years. 1 7 For instance, the dispute in the adjudication may involve the nature, quantity, and priority of water rights. However, the same parties may later
find themselves engaged in conflict over providing water in-stream for
endangered fish recovery or may confront a drought or a water quality
problem. Consequently, the ability of the parties to work together effectively can be an important asset. Negotiated settlements provide
some advantages over adjudications because they engage stakeholders
in identifying strategies, debating their merits, allocating the cost bur112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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117. Bonnie G. Colby, Negotiated Transactionsas Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Water
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den, and building consensus for a particular approach." 8 The process
gives the stakeholders experience in working together and may make it
easier to solve the next regional water problem. Litigation encourages
an adversarial approach among the parties rather than a problemsolving stance. 9 One would expect improved problem-solving capacity
when stakeholders face a subsequent dispute after they have successfully resolved an earlier conflict through multi-party negotiations, as
compared to having resolved the earlier conflict through litigation.
However, there is little empirical evidence to either support or negate
this hypothesis.
A broad criterion applicable to adjudications is "durability under
uncertainty." This criterion assesses the degree to which the adjudication process and rulings consider drought, environmental factors, and
other natural contingencies that may create new uncertainties for water users in the future. While these considerations may not be the
mandate of the court, to the extent that rulings are specific about adaptation to drought and other uncertainties that affect exercise of water rights, they can be helpful in planning for these contingencies.
Climate change is one looming source of uncertainty facing the western water community. Careful evaluation of adjudications should inquire whether these processes will help address the future effects of
climate change, and do so in a more cost effective manner than other
possible alternatives.
One important factor that affects the durability of the positive results that adjudication can achieve is the degree to which various interests are represented in the process. Ramsey Kropf has pointed out that
adjudications have a specific mandate and are not intended to resolve
regional water challenges or to be "all things to all people."

20

Never-

theless, to the degree possible, it is useful for adjudication proceedings
to consider a diverse range of regional interests and claims. Environmental needs for water are a pressing water management challenge in
nearly every western basin, but one not likely to be addressed where
environmental interests and agencies do not hold water rights. One

possible way to incorporate these interests into adjudications is for
those unrepresented interests to become water right owners to a
greater degree than through the environmental acquisitions that already have occurred. The facilitation of broader participation of envi118.
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ronmental interests as right holders will require policies that provide
funds for water right purchases or that provide a share of water for
environmental purposes when a water right is transferred. This is possible through environmental trust funds, which could essentially take a
"cut for the environment" from a transferred water right. Environmental advocates can participate directly in adjudication processes
where they are right holders. Bringing them directly into the process
may be necessary to help alleviate long running conflicts over water for
environmental needs in many western river basins.
VI. CLOSING THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Analysis of the costs and benefits of adjudications and alternative
proceedings may be a task well-suited to the Water Resource Research
Institutes found in each U.S. state and territory, usually at the land
grant university.12' Such institutes typically have good communication
with the water stakeholders in their state and may be effective at collecting the necessary data for systematic adjudication assessments.
The insurance industry has become quite sophisticated in assessing
risk and establishing fees for policies that reduce the effects of risk on
policyholders. Major ski resorts, for instance, often purchase policies
that stabilize their revenues in the event of a poor snow year. In principle (and for a profit), private firms could offer insurance for the financial repercussions linked to uncertain water right yields by systematically and scientifically assessing risk and charging fees accordingly.
The federal government absorbs some of the economic consequences
of drought for farmers through its crop insurance programs and disaster relief payments.
One of the largest challenges water adjudications face is the uncertainty of a system dependent on climate, with precipitation and tem22
perature being major determinants of water supply and demand.
Global warming will change the hydrologic cycles of the western
United States in innumerable ways, many of which we can only roughly
anticipate. Assessment of the likely yield of water rights under dry
conditions will continue to become more crucial. Enforcement of priorities is likely to become the norm in the future, despite the fact that
it is largely theoretical at the present time. l The financial value of
improved water right certainty is likely to increase steadily in the face
of climate change combined with population growth.

121. SeeWater Resources Research, 42 U.S.C. § 10301(9) (2000).
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123. See Dan Tarlock, General Stream Adjudications: A Good Public Investment?, 133 J.
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The economically "optimal" balance of certainty in water rights differs across regions and over time. It is not worthwhile to create sophisticated property right regimes and to clarify all contingencies in advance of need when water is plentiful and cheap. However, in overappropriated river basins there is sound economic rationale for investing in more certainty. The tradeoff in spending money to create more
certainty is a delicate one. It is counterproductive if ambiguities burden the water acquisition process so heavily that socially desirable
transfers fail to occur. However, it is unreasonable to expend so much
money trying to reduce uncertainty that the costs of adjudication or an
alternative process are out of proportion to the economic stakes, the
value of water, and decisions that hinge on more certainty about water
rights.
The fact that stakeholders receive different "products" for the
money that they invest in different processes confounds comparisons
of benefits and costs across alternative adjudicatory processes. In litigation, the ideal payoff for environmental advocates is a ruling that both
favors their position in the particular case at hand and sets a favorable
precedent for future disputes. In market transactions, the payoff is
acquisition of water. Investment in alternative dispute resolution
strategies provides differing types of results. An assessment strategy
needs to consider the different mix of benefits that each alternative
process produces given that, with existing data, we cannot conduct a
systematic comparison of costs. The potential criteria for evaluating
adjudications presented earlier in this article can provide a framework
for comparing different kinds of end "products."
While a thorough economic assessment of adjudications will require several years of systematic data collection and analysis, practical
steps can be adopted now. First, parties should be required to report
costs of participating in adjudication processes in a regular and systematic manner, such a filing standardized quarterly reports. 2 4 Second,
information that the parties use in the adjudication venue should become part of the public record and be available to others. Over time,
this will create a valuable body of data, models and other information
on hydrology, fish biology, wildlife needs, recreation use, etc. Finally, a
cooperative effort amongst land grant universities, state water agencies,
and federal agencies to initiate a research effort aimed at carefully
identifying principal costs and benefits of these processes could help
guide future adjudications.

124. See U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution, Program Evaluation
System, available at http://www.ecr.gov/multiagency/program-eval.htm (discussing
protocols for collecting data on the cost of multi-party dispute resolution processes
from participants).
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In closing, two words add pressing impetus to the need to resolve
water right ambiguities: climate change. Climate change over the next
several decades is likely to substantially alter temperature, water demand, and water supply conditions throughout the western U.S., compounding current water conflicts. The socio-economic stakes associated with water rights and water management will increase exponentially. The next generation of water attorneys, economists, engineers,
planners, managers, and public officials will need to be much more
innovative than those of us currently filling those roles. One positive
legacy we can leave for the future is carefully structured and effective
process for addressing water rights ambiguities. Systematic evaluation
of current adjudication processes is an important first step.

